Introduction
The so-called "Part I" of Philosophical Investigations (PI) contains many claims concerning the grammar of psychological predicates, and particularly about the conditions for ascribing them to others. The following are some of the most well-known (and also most representative) among such claims: (i) "only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious"; 1 (ii) "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria." 2 The content of these and other kindred remarks has led a great number of readers to ascribe some kind of "externalistic" 3 account to the author of the Investigations.
The Problem of Other Minds in PI I
At the beginning of PI, Wittgenstein raises a question which (come to think of it) seems to underlie quite a big deal of what goes on under the label of "philosophy of mind," namely: "What gives us so much as the idea that beings, things, can feel ?" 7 As it often happens with Wittgenstein's writings, I believe that question was carefully crafted in order to elicit certain sorts of philosophical responses from the readers; in this particular instance, the intended responses would give vent to a sense of astonishment, on the one hand, and to a kind of anxiety or restlessness, on the other.
The first response would come from the realization of a remarkable (although normally unnoticed) feature of our linguistic practices -namely, that we do ascribe feelings (or, more generally, psychological predicates) to mere things, i.e., mere bunches of matter, which as such are not intrinsically different from other such he is in pain from his movements -one sees that he is suffering. Pain-behaviour is a criterion of being in pain, as joyous behaviour is a criterion of being joyful" (ibid., 43).
7. Wittgenstein, PI, §283.
What we have in this passage is the raw material for what is known in philosophy as the "argument by analogy" for the ascription of "inner" (psychological) states to "external objects" (such as other persons). Now a very common charge raised against that argument is that it is question-begging, in that the correlation between mind and behavior that it assumes is precisely what needs to be proved. However common, that is not a charge Wittgenstein himself will consider in this context. Rather, what he seems to be aiming at is an idea -or, more precisely, a picture 10 -which not only underpins the whole argument, but also (and more importantly) prompts the initial question which puts it in motion, namely the picture of the privacy of the mental, 8. There are, of course, lots of extrinsic differences among living and non-living things, such as the degree of organizational complexly and behavior, and we shall soon explore them at some length. Right now I will only advance that those differences, far from quenching our astonishment, are rather apt to increase it: after all, how could such subtleties account for a (supposedly) absolute metaphysical difference between living and non-living beings?
9. Wittgenstein, PI, §283. 10. See esp. ibid., §115 (and its surroundings) and ibid., II. §xi for the precise, quasi-technical use of this term. Now that picture is apt to present itself very naturally when we think about the difficulties we sometimes face in understanding what happens to others around us, be it because they are unable to express their true feelings, or because they intentionally hide them from us. Moreover, each of us has probably experienced that same (in)capacity in one's own case. Fixation on those (real, N.B.) difficulties can make it seem as if all well-succeeded interpersonal communication were a matter of mere chance, as if there was a metaphysical and epistemological gulf between myself and my own (private) experiences, on the one hand, and other (so-called) "people" and their (so-called) "experiences," on the other. 12 For some philosophical sensibilities that possibility would be relatively easy to dismiss: the fact that our communication works (in general) would be more than enough for practical purposes. Yet Wittgenstein characteristically does not take such an easy way out of a philosophical difficulty. What he does instead is to press it further, drawing attention to some possible consequences of the picture under analysis which would affect much more directly our relations with others -if only we gave it the attention it deserves. One such consequence is brought to the fore again through a pair of questions: "Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of a baby is not pretence? -And on what experience is our assumption based?" 13 Given the lack of an unassailable ("intra-experiential") ground implied by the latter question, the insistence on the need to "make assumptions" -i.e., to infer from one's own case how things really are with others (see the argument above) -would ultimately lead to doubt whether (other) people really have minds at all: "If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means -must I not say that of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?" 14
The lesson here seems to be: I cannot (or should not) generalize so irresponsibly. This is the core of the problem of other minds. 16. This is not the only kind of therapeutic device he employs to that end. Another well known strategy is the deconstruction of the model of sensations as private entities -see esp. Wittgenstein, PI, §293-94, the passages presenting the thought-experiment of the "beetle in the box"; the point of that strategy, as the traditional reading would have it, is quite simple: if sensations are construed as private somethings, i.e., as entities which are accessible only by the ones who have them, they become as useless in our language-game(s) -as the (supposed) "thing" named by the word "beetle" in the case imagined by Wittgenstein. That is precisely the situation of the defender of the "argument from analogy" who accepts the picture of privacy, including the model of sensations as private entities, but insists on doing that "irresponsible generalization," ascribing sensations thus construed to other persons. Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains. 18 To most readers convinced of the general view I presented above the moral of the latter passage has seemed very clear: the reason why we do not transfer our idea to stones, plants, etc., is that these things do not behave like a human being. Behaving like a human being, therefore, is a necessary condition for the ascription of painsor, more generally, "souls" -to things. But is it also a sufficient condition? If it were, then we would be automatically justified, even compelled, to ascribe sensations or souls to beings such as androids or replicants. 19 -Well, are we not?
Apparently the Wittgensteinian answer would be: yes, we are. Take, for example, the following passage:
Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. -One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well ascribe it to a number! -And now look at a wriggling fly, and at once these difficulties vanish, and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it. 20 The final part of this passage seems to license a reasoning along these lines: well, if one can ascribe sensations such as pains even to flies, what about beings as complex as androids or replicants? Do we have any reason to deny that those beings have souls which would not amount to a reason to deny the same of our paradigmatic cases, i.e., (other) human beings?
17. I have here decided to keep Anscombe's original choice of the word "soul" to translate "seele," instead of Hacker and Schulte's "mind." The latter justify their change in the Preface to the new edition, claiming that in §283 "what is at issue is mind, not soul, and the problems of mind and body, not of the soul and the body" (xiv). I simply do not share their sense of obviousness about this point; in fact, I take it that this might be yet another symptom of a reading which does not pay due attention to the connections between Wittgenstein's treatment of the conditions to ascribe psychological predicates in this context and in Part II.
18 But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual? -If I imagine it now -alone in my room -I see people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business -the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. But just try to hang on to this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others -in the street, say! Say to yourself, for example: "The children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism." And you will either find these words becoming quite empty; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.
Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example. 21
In analyzing this passage I would like to emphasize three points: (i) it offers an explicit parallel between the experience of seeing aspects in figures and the experience of seeing aspects of living beings (i.e., seeing them as automatons / as humans); (ii) it also indicates that the change in our perception depends on a larger context (the change is easier "alone in my room," but more difficult "in the street," in the midst of my "ordinary intercourse" with others); (iii) finally, it shows that this change comes, if at all, only at a great cost -that of risking emptiness, or the production of "uncanny feelings."
I will have more to say about points (i) and (ii) below. Right now I would like to highlight a connection between the last point and a rather more familiar Wittgen-
steinian contention -namely, that our perception of living beings as "ensouled" is a matter of attitude, not opinion or belief. That contention is expressed in passages such as the following (among many others):
(1 and not occasionally like a machine.) "I believe that he is not an automaton," just like that, so far makes no sense. My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. 24
23. Ibid., §303. 24. Ibid., II. §iv ( § §20-22, in Hacker and Schulte's edn.). Appearances notwithstanding, I do not think Wittgenstein's purpose in these and related passages is to draw a quasi-technical distinction between "attitude" on the one hand, and "belief" or "opinion" on the other -in that sense I agree with Peter Winch, "Eine Einstellung zur Seele," Proceedings of Aristotelian Society LXXXI (1980-81): 1-16. What Wittgenstein is willing to criticize is a certain understanding of the (supposed) "belief" or "opinion" -namely one whereby (i) to take human beings as such and (ii) to believe that a particular human being is, e.g., suffering would be, so to speak, at the same level. To take (or to avoid taking) a human being as a being that has a "soul" is a much more fundamental attitude, in the sense that it is a condition of possibility so that, on particular occasions in a language-game, one can be certain or in doubt about whether the other is suffering or not. In other words: if, at any particular time, one has good reasons to question whether the other is human or an automaton, then, on that particular occasion, it would not make sense to argue over whether, say, the other is really suffering, or is simply faking it. We would lack the background against which that kind of "empirical" doubt could arise. Descartes, in a famous passage of Meditations, argues that it is strictly incorrect to say that we see men through the window, because what we do is in fact a judgment -we judge, that is, that those spectra we see through the window are real men. I think that statement perfectly exemplifies the kind of opinion against which Wittgenstein is arguing in passages as these. To respond to other human beings as beings endowed with "souls," and not as "mere automatons," is not to make a kind of inference from observation of something more "basic" or "immediate," such as the perception of the behavior of certain "spectra or fictitious men who move only by springs." The logical priority is being inverted on the Cartesian analysis. -Only against the background of certain attitudes we take relatively to the world and others (empirical) doubt and certainty can arise. (I shall here postpone the question whether one can really and legitimately have doubts other than those.)
The emphasis conveyed by these passages on our attitudes or reactions (as opposed to opinions or beliefs) brings to the fore a central aspect of Stanley Cavell's thinking about the "problem of other minds" -namely, that 'the problem' is not a matter of (mere) knowledge, but rather of acknowledgment. Cavell introduces the latter concept in "Knowing and Acknowledging" as follows: "your suffering makes a claim upon me. It is not enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer -I must do or reveal something (whatever can be done). In a word, I must acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what '(your or his) being in pain' means." 25 Whence the conclusion that "the alternative to my acknowledgment of the other is not my ignorance of him but my avoidance of him, call it my denial of him." 26 These formulations are meant to emphasize that we -that is, each of ushave an active role and an irreducible (although all-too-easily evadable) responsibility in adopting a certain attitude in the face of others. This, I take it, is an important first step toward explaining why, even when all the behavioral criteria for the ascription of "humanity" are met, one can still avoid adopting that 'attitude towards a soul' of which Wittgenstein speaks, treating those living beings instead as mere automatons. Cavell calls that possibility "soul-blindness." 27 In the next section I shall try to clarify our understanding of that possibility presenting a more detailed comparison with the case of aspect perception.
Aspect Perception and the Problem of Other Minds
In part IV of The Claim of Reason Cavell sums up his reading of PI II §xi as follows: 27. See ibid., 378ff. Cavell intends that notion to be parallel to Wittgenstein's notions of "aspect-" and "meaning-blindness." The first is introduced in PI, II. §xi as follows: "Could there be human beings lacking the ability to see something as something -and what would that be like? What sort of consequences would it have? -Would this defect be comparable to colour-blindness, or to not having absolute pitch? -We will call it 'aspect-blindness'" (PI, §xi/257). Roughly: an aspect-blind person is one who cannot experience the switch between two or more aspects of an ambiguous picture; similarly, a meaning-blind person is one who would be unable to experience the switch between two or more meanings of a word, such as the German "Bank" (ibid., §xi/262-63).
To know another mind is to interpret a physiognomy, and the message of this region of the Investigations is that this is not a matter of "mere knowing." I have to read the physiognomy, and see the creature according to my reading, and treat it according to my seeing. The human body is the best picture of the human soul -not, I feel like adding, primarily because it represents the soul but because it expresses it. The body is the field of expression of the soul. 28 Now, if knowing other minds really involves interpreting -or better: reading 29 -a physiognomy, and thus seeing a human body in a certain way, then of course it must be possible not to do so. That attestation might lead one to conclude that there is, after all, a perfect parallel between the experience of seeing aspects in ambiguous pictures and the experience of seeing aspects in human (or, more generally, animated) bodies, in that in both cases one can fail to see the 'thing' in question as X (as a rabbit, as an animated / ensouled / human being, etc). An important concern of Cavell in the final part of The Claim of Reason (and also in more recent writings 30 ) is to explore the limits of that parallel, thus aiming at identifying the real difficulty underlying the "problem of other minds" (the real obstacle to our acknowledgment of others).
I suggested above that it is natural, or, in any case, not wholly unnatural for us to express a discomfort with (what we take as) the limits of our knowledge of other minds as if it were a result of their being hidden, unaccessible by our naked eye. In PI, Wittgenstein characterizes that feeling -"I can't know what is going on in him" -as "above all, a picture," which is further identified as "the convincing expression of a conviction." 31 Taking that description as his starting point, Cavell invites us to de- Implicit in Cavell's analysis at this point 34 is the suggestion that the human body can actually be seen as a veil by some particular other human being, in certain particular contexts -that this is a real, however uncommon and uncanny possibility in our lived experience, and not merely a 'philosophical invention' devised to put forward skeptical arguments. Yet by entering that suggestion he does not mean to imply that when one raises skeptical doubts concerning other minds one is (or should be)
actually seeing others as automatons. Not at all; yet, calling attention to that fact will not impress our skeptical philosopher, who is already impressed by the sheer possibility of that kind of "aspect-change," which in his/her view brings to the fore the fragility or groundlessness of his/her ordinary attitude toward the other, thus (and understandably) prompting anxiety. 35 Now it was just that kind of anxiety that Wittgenstein was tempting the reader to experiment in PI 36 and he did that precisely by facilitating or precipitating a series of aspect-changes -"what I perceive in the lighting up of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and Cavell, Claim, 368. 33. Ibid. 34 . Explicit elsewhere -e.g., in his reading of Othello at the end of Claim. 35. As Cavell says in another context "The anxiety lies not just in the fact that my understanding has limits, but that I must draw them, on apparently no more ground than my own." (Claim, 115). To have to draw those limits in the case of our relation to one another is what Cavell calls our 'exposure' -"To accept my exposure in the case of others seems to imply an acceptance of the possibility that my knowledge of others may be overthrown, even that it ought to be." (Claim, 439; see also 432, 435). A further projection of that useful concept has been recently provided by Cora Diamond, thus extending its application to the case of our relation with non-human animals: "Our 'exposure' in the case of animals lies in there being nothing but our own responsibility, our own making the best of it. We are not, here too, in what we might take to be the 'ideal' position. We want to be able to see that, given what animals are, and given also our properties, what we are like (given our 'marks and features' and theirs), there are general principles that establish the moral significance of their suffering compared to ours, of their needs compared to ours, and we could then see what treatment of them was and what was not morally justified. We would be given the presence or absence of moral community (or thus-and-such degree or kind of moral community) with animals. But we are exposed -that is, we are thrown into finding something we can live with, and it may at best be a kind of bitter-tasting compromise. There is here only what we make of our exposure, and it leaves us endless room for double-dealing and deceit." (In Cavell et. al., Animal, 72 The former is a very specific visual experience with characteristic forms of verbal expression (or Äusserungen); the latter is an attitude whose presence is sometimes revealed in an individual's susceptibility to aspect-dawning experiences, but which also finds expression in a variety of other fine shades of verbal and non-verbal behaviour. This attitude is certainly not a continuous sequence of aspect-dawning experiences -not a continuous trying or aiming at something; and neither is it a matter of taking something to be the thing it isa turn of phrase which implies the availability of an alternative way of taking it, which is precisely what the attitude of continuous seeing as is defined as excluding. 42 In sum: continuous aspect perception is "a further species of our 'regarding-as' response to pictures" 43 -one might say it is our default response 44 to them; the experience of aspect-dawning, on the contrary, is an exception which proves the rule. 44. Mulhall says that "our general relation to pictures is one of continuous aspect perception" (see ibid.), meaning (I take it) that this is the kind of relation that we normally (i.e., except in
With that distinction in hand we can formulate more precisely the analogy between the possibility of "aspect-change" involved in our experience of other (living) bodies and the experience of seeing aspects more generally. Clearly, we (that is, most of us, most of the time) do not (ordinarily) take that we know as human beings for human beings, as it would happen in an experience of aspect-dawning. (Human beings are not, in this sense, analogous to ambiguous pictures. 45 ) Yet, as PI illustrates, 46 in very special circumstances we can stop (avoid, fail) to see human beings as such, and this would be analogous to the (similarly uncanny) experience of making familiar words lose their meanings after much repetition. 47 What that (exceptional) possibility of aspect-change shows, therefore, is that we continuously see human beings as hu- 
extraordinary contexts -such as those of aspect-dawning) take to them. One of the main tenets of Mulhall's analysis is to show that the paradoxicalness involved in the experience of aspect-dawning stems precisely from that general tendency: we take it entirely for granted that pictures depict something or someone, and relate to them as we do to the thing/person depicted, "to the point at which we naturally transfer responses appropriate to what is depicted to their depictions" (ibid.); thus, "when it suddenly dawns on us that this particular picture-rabbit is also a picture-duck, when we express our experience quite as if it registers the picture-rabbit's actually becoming a picture-duck, our sense that everything about it has changed (despite our knowledge that nothing has changed) can be seen as an unusually extreme expression of our general tendency to regard a picture of a rabbit as being as different from a picture of a duck as a rabbit is from a duck" (ibid).
45. In this sense, too, one might say with Gould that: "It makes no sense for me to think of myself as deciding -in each case of a possible 'other,' as the other presents itself to my capacity for apprehension -whether or not the other's words (and gestures and actions) are 'expressive' of something, call it a mind or a soul." -"An Allegory of Affinities: On Seeing a World of Aspects in a Universe of Things," in Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, ed. William Day and Victor J. Krebs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 74. And yet, as I shall soon try to show (apparently contra Gould), that does not imply that soul-blindness is not a real possibility for beings like us.
46. Wittgenstein, PI, §420. 47. What Wittgenstein seems to be aiming at by reminding us of that possibility is just how remarkable is the fact that words (normally) have meanings, as it were on their own faces; that seems to be the effect of the language-game of PI, §1, where some (extra) degree of mechanization is employed in the description precisely in order to remind us of what is going on in our ordinary life with words. (I am here echoing a point made by Steven Affeldt in his contribution to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew.)
48. Wittgenstein, PI, §420.!! jects," 49 might help us get a clearer understanding of the issues under analysis. One implication I would like to emphasize is that changing the background against which one looks at something (a picture, a living body) can help one to see a previously hidden aspect of it, precisely by helping one to make different connections between it and other objects. At least figuratively, that is precisely what Wittgenstein tries to do when dealing with philosophical pictures, such as the one of the body as a veil. This is what happens when he, in Cavell's words, reinterprets or replaces that "myth," keeping some fragments of the original picture -namely, the idea that the soul is something that can, at least in principle, be seen -while attempting to shift the location of the "block" to our vision. The expected result is to show that the body does not hide the mind, but rather expresses or depicts it. It is in the (human) body that the (human) ensouled aspect can be seen, if only one draws the right connections. By the same token:
The block to my vision of the other is not the other's body but my incapacity or unwillingness to interpret or to judge it accurately, to draw the right connections. The suggestion is: I suffer a kind of blindness, but I avoid the issue by projecting this darkness upon the other. The mythology according to which the body is a picture implies that the soul may be hidden not because the body essentially conceals it but because it essentially reveals it. The soul may be invisible to us the way something absolutely present may be invisible to us.
[…] We may say that the rabbit-aspect is hidden from us when we fail to see it. But what hides it is then obviously not the picture (that reveals it), but our (prior) way of taking it, namely in its duck-aspect. What hides one aspect is another aspect, something at the same level. So we might say: What hides the mind is not the body but the mind itself -his his, or mine his, and contrariwise. 50 Recall once again that passage about seeing others as automatons. 51 There Wittgenstein distinguishes two contexts: in the first we are invited to imagine ourselves "alone 4. Soul-blindness (or: "Living Our Skepticism") I hope the preceding considerations are enough to suggest that discrete occurrences of soul-blindness are real (if uncommon and uncanny) possibilities for beings like us.
A further question that might be raised is whether one can make sense of the possibility of systematical soul-blindness. I take it that Cavell's answer to that question would also be positive, much against the grain of widespread analytical dogmatism, including orthodox Wittgensteinianism; only the cost of that attitude would be higher: instead of "uncanny feelings," the result would be the brutalization of the individuals suffering that "blindness," which is precisely the stuff of tragedy. 53
52. "In making the knowledge of others a metaphysical difficulty, philosophers deny how real the practical difficulty is of coming to know another person, and how little we can reveal of ourselves to another's gaze, or bear of it. Doubtless such denials are part of the motive which sustains metaphysical difficulties." (Cavell, Claim, 90) . In order to understand the radicalism of Cavell's proposal I would like to compare it briefly with the well-known (and, I take it, representative) account offered by Peter Strawson in his essay "Freedom and Resentment." 54 The argument presented in that essay is framed by the dispute between Determinists and Libertarians on the issue of free-will. It might, accordingly, seem very distant from the topics examined above. But in order to see the connections that are relevant for our purposes I propose to set the "frame" of the argument aside, looking directly at the center of the picture. What we then find is an investigation of the conditions of human action grounded on the analysis of some particular instances of interpersonal relations and attitudes -most notably those of gratitude, resentment, and forgiveness. One of the central features Strawson highlights about those attitudes is that they are apt to be radically modified according to the way the actions that bring them about are qualified 55 . Those modifications can be brought about in a large number of (very common) situations in our human relationships; but there are also some less common situations where our ordinary reactions would not only be modified but rather altogether suppressed.
This would happen, for instance, in those cases where one might be willing to describe an agent who performed an action that harmed oneself by using phrases such as: "He wasn't himself," "He has been under very great strain recently," "He's only a child," "He's a hopeless schizophrenic," "His mind has been systematically perverted," "That's purely compulsive behaviour on his part," etc. 56 By drawing our attention to the sort of excuses expressed by those phrases, Strawson wants to make us aware of situations in which someone's actions would invite us "to suspend our ordinary reactive attitudes toward the agent," seeing him "in a different light from the light in which we should normally view one who has acted as he has acted." 57 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (New York: Routledge, 2008), 1-28. 55. The following case illustrates this point: "If someone treads on my hand accidentally, while trying to help me, the pain may be no less acute than if he treads on it in contemptuous disregard of my existence or with a malevolent wish to injure me. But I shall generally feel in the second case a kind and degree of resentment that I shall not feel in the first. If someone's actions help me to some benefit I desire, then I am benefited in any case; but if he intended them so to benefit me because of his general goodwill toward me, I shall reasonably feel a gratitude which I should not feel at all if the benefit was an incidental consequence, unintended or even regretted by him, of some plan of action with a different aim." (ibid., 6 Press, 1985) , 34. Strawson also describes that change as one which "does not seem to be something of which human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it'" (Freedom, 12). The main candidate to such a ground examined (and dismissed) by Strawson in this paper is, of course, the "theoretical conviction of the truth of determinism" (ibid., 14).
63. Cavell, Claim, 437.
ing: "the alternative to my acknowledgement of the other is not my ignorance of him but my avoidance of him, call it my denial of him." 68 What might be lacking when acknowledgement is not forthcoming is attunement -and again this is not, or not simply, a matter of belief or natural inclination, but rather something that, as Anthony
Rudd has said: "may depend on one's willingness to be attuned; or to acknowledge one's attunement or to acknowledge the other." 69 One might say: where acknowledgement (or its denial) is concerned, knowledge or belief come always too latenotwithstanding our self-indulgent rationalizations to the contrary.
(Let me try to be clear about one point: I really think we should grant to Strawson that there would be something rather unwelcome or even untenable involved in the generalized adoption an "objective" or "detached" attitude toward others -many of us would certainly prefer not to live in a world where that attitude became stan-
dard; yet that is very different from saying that such change would be "practically impossible," or unnatural, or inhuman. And let us not go astray about the latter qualification: granted, we often do describe attitudes that we would rather not see other 70. Cavell, Claim, 438. 71 . Again, this is a point that Cavell himself made clear in a passage where he comments on the nature of slavery and Nazism: "The anxiety in the image of slavery -not confined to it, but most openly dramatized by it -is that it really is a way in which certain human beings can treat certain others whom they know, or all but know, to be human beings. Rather than admit this we say that the ones do not regard the others as human beings at all. (To understand Nazism, whatever that will mean, will be to understand it as a human possibility; monstrous, unforgiveable, but not therefore the conduct of monsters. Monsters are not unforgivable, and not forgivable. We do not bear the right internal relation to them for forgiveness to apply.) To admit that the slaveowner regards the slave as a kind of human being bases slavery on nothing more than some indefinite claim of difference, some inexpressible ground of exclusion of others from existence in our realm of justice. It is too close to something we might at any time discover." (Claim, 377-78).
